CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION
Reply to:
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Washington, D.C. 20009
(502) 721-9220 (617) 451-0855 (202) 986-3000
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Question: Must notice of procedural
safeguards under IDEA be written in plain English?
Answer: Yes. An often-overlooked provision of IDEA requires that the notice of
procedural safeguards must be written in an "easily understandable
manner."
Application: Schools
should not hand out the state rules and regulations as their official
procedural safeguards notices. They must provide plain-language explanations
of the parents' procedural rights under IDEA.
Procedural safeguards notices must be written
in an "easily understandable manner." 20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2). The
regulatory standard for this requirement is that the notice must be
"Written in language understandable to the general public." 34 C.F.R.
§300.503(c)(1)(i), incorporated by reference by 34 C.F.R. §300.504(c). Such
notices are required to be given (1) upon initial referral for evaluation, (2)
upon each notification of an IEP meeting, (3) upon reevaluation of the child,
and (4) upon receipt of a request for due process. 34 C.F.R. §300.504(a). In addition, notice that is written in
language understandable to the general public” must be given to parents of a
child with a disability a reasonable time before the public agency proposes to
initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child or provision of FAPE to the child; or refuses to initiate or change
the educational placement of the child or the provision of FAPE to the child.
34 C.F.R. 300.503(a).
While not frequently litigated, caselaw
suggests that the plain language provision explicitly disqualifies "[t]he
unembellished technical language of the Rules and Regulations" as adequate
notice. Max M. v. Thompson,592 F.Supp. 1437, 1448. (N.D.Ill. 1984)
(holding that such failure led to violation of the plaintiff's procedural
rights under the EAHCA). But see Max M. v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 629 F.Supp. 1504 (holding the procedural error harmless because the
policy intent of involving parents and obtaining consent was met). Thus,
providing parents the state code or rules and regulations without an effort
translating them into plain language would be a violation of the parents'
procedural rights. See Thompson.
It may be that written notice, in plain
English and meeting the aforementioned standards, is important but neither
necessary nor sufficient to providing adequate notice of procedural rights.
According to Illinois State Bd. of Educ., the appellate review of Thompson,
the court found that the basic policy purposes of notice — involving parents in
supervising and making decisions about the child's educational plan — were met
in that case. Because "the parents were quite involved with assessing the
educational and supportive services their child was to receive from the school
district and had the professional advice of a psychiatrist familiar with the
EAHCA," the procedural errors were harmless. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ. at 1518.
However, Illinois State Bd. of Educ.
did not overturn the finding that the written notice was inadequate; in fact it
confirmed the District Court's conclusion. Because the specific facts of Thompson
can be distinguished from most situations that lead to legal complaints —
exclusion of parents from a meaningful role in deciding their children's
educational placement and services — the harmless error defense offered by Illinois
State Bd. of Educ. is unlikely to available to schools who do not provide
plain English notice of procedural rights under IDEA.
While many cases addressing adequacy of
notice likely involve notice falling short of the Thompson standard, few
advocates are aware of, much less litigate, the requirement that notice be
given in plain English. Thus, cases in which courts approve of the adequacy of
notice despite their opacity or outright replication of statutory language
should be distinguished because they do not reach the issue of plain language. See,
e.g., Edmond Public Schools v. V.R., Ok. Dist. Ct. Civ-99-750-R (January
28, 2000) (finding that because parents refused to give school opportunity to
clarify orally, notice was adequate[1]).
[1]
The language in the notice included, in part, "During the pendency of any
administrative or judicial proceeding regarding a complaint, unless the public
agency and the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the
complaint must remain in his or her present educational placement." At 11.